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ABSTRACT
We discuss problems the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) paradigm poses for replication and
more broadly in the biomedical and social sciences as well as how these problems remain unresolved
by proposals involving modified p-value thresholds, confidence intervals, and Bayes factors. We then
discuss our own proposal, which is to abandon statistical significance. We recommend dropping the NHST
paradigm—and the p-value thresholds intrinsic to it—as the default statistical paradigm for research,
publication, and discovery in the biomedical and social sciences. Specifically, we propose that the p-value
be demoted from its threshold screening role and instead, treated continuously, be considered along with
currently subordinate factors (e.g., related prior evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data
quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by research domain) as
just one among many pieces of evidence. We have no desire to “ban” p-values or other purely statistical
measures. Rather, we believe that such measures should not be thresholded and that, thresholded or
not, they should not take priority over the currently subordinate factors. We also argue that it seldom
makes sense to calibrate evidence as a function of p-values or other purely statistical measures. We offer
recommendations for how our proposal can be implemented in the scientific publication process as well as
in statistical decision making more broadly.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received October 2017
Revised September 2018
KEYWORDS
Null hypothesis significance
testing; p-Value; Replication;
Sociology of science;
Statistical significance
1. The Status Quo and Two Alternatives
The biomedical and social sciences are facing a widespread
crisis with published findings failing to replicate at an alarm-
ing rate. Often, such failures to replicate are associated with
claims of huge effects from subtle, sometimes even preposterous,
interventions. Further, the primary evidence adduced for these
claims is one or more comparisons that are anointed “statis-
tically significant”—typically defined as comparisons with p-
values less than the conventional 0.05 threshold relative to the
sharp point null hypothesis of zero effect and zero systematic
error.
Indeed, the status quo is that p < 0.05 is deemed as strong
evidence in favor of a scientific theory and is required not
only for a result to be published but even for it to be taken
seriously. Specifically, statistical significance serves as a lexi-
cographic decision rule whereby any result is first required to
have a p-value that attains the 0.05 threshold and only then
is consideration—often scant—given to such factors as related
prior evidence, plausibility ofmechanism, study design and data
quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of finding, and
other factors that vary by research domain (for want of a better
term, we hereafter refer to these collectively as the currently
subordinate factors).
CONTACT Blakeley B. McShane b-mcshane@kellogg.northwestern.edu Marketing Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2211
Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208.
Traditionally, the p < 0.05 rule has been considered a safe-
guard against noise-chasing and thus a guarantor of replicability.
However, in recent years, a series of well-publicized examples
(e.g., Carney, Cuddy, and Yap 2010; Bem 2011) coupled with
theoretical work hasmade it clear that statistical significance can
easily be obtained from pure noise. Consequently, low replica-
tion rates are to be expected given existing scientific practices
(Ioannidis 2005; Smaldino and McElreath 2016), and calls for
reform, which are not new (see, e.g., Meehl 1978), have become
insistent.
One proposal, suggested by Benjamin and 71 coauthors
including distinguished scholars from a wide variety of fields,
is to redefine statistical significance, “to change the default p-
value threshold for statistical significance for claims of new
discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005” (Benjamin et al. 2018).While, as
they note, “changing the p-value threshold is simple, aligns with
the training undertaken bymany researchers, andmight quickly
achieve broad acceptance,” we believe this “quick fix,” this “dam
to contain the flood” in the words of a prominentmember of the
72 (Resnick 2017), is insufficient to overcome current difficulties
with replication. Instead, we believe it opportune to proceed
immediately with other measures, perhaps more radical and
more difficult but also more principled and more permanent.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
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In particular, we propose to abandon statistical significance,
to drop the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)
paradigm—and the p-value thresholds intrinsic to it—as the
default statistical paradigm for research, publication, and
discovery in the biomedical and social sciences. Specifically,
rather than allowing statistical significance as determined
by p < 0.05 (or some other threshold whether based on
p-values, confidence intervals, Bayes factors, or some other
purely statistical measure) to serve as a lexicographic decision
rule in scientific publication and statistical decision making
more broadly, we propose that the p-value be demoted from its
threshold screening role and instead, treated continuously, be
considered along with the currently subordinate factors as just
one among many pieces of evidence.
To be clear, we have no desire to “ban” p-values or other
purely statistical measures. Rather, we believe that such mea-
sures should not be thresholded and that, thresholded or not,
they should not take priority over the currently subordinate
factors. We also argue that it seldom makes sense to calibrate
evidence as a function of p-values or other purely statistical
measures.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss general problems
with NHST that motivate our proposal to abandon statistical
significance and that remain unresolved by the Benjamin et al.
(2018) proposal. We then discuss problems specific to the Ben-
jamin et al. (2018) proposal.We next offer recommendations for
how, in practice, the p-value can be demoted from its threshold
screening role and instead be considered as just one among
many pieces of evidence in the scientific publication process as
well as in statistical decisionmakingmore broadly.We conclude
with a brief discussion.
2. Problems General to Null Hypothesis Significance
Testing
2.1. Preface
As noted, the NHST paradigm upon which the status quo and
the Benjamin et al. (2018) proposal rest is the default statis-
tical paradigm for research, publication, and discovery in the
biomedical and social sciences (see, e.g., Morrison and Henkel
1970; Sawyer and Peter 1983; Gigerenzer 1987; McCloskey and
Ziliak 1996; Gill 1999; Anderson, Burnham, and Thompson
2000; Gigerenzer 2004; Hubbard 2004). Despite this, it has been
roundly criticized both inside and outside of statistics over the
decades (see, e.g., Rozenboom 1960; Bakan 1966; Meehl 1978;
Serlin and Lapsley 1993; Cohen 1994; McCloskey and Ziliak
1996; Schmidt 1996; Hunter 1997; Gill 1999; Gigerenzer 2004;
Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Vitouch 2004; Briggs 2016; McShane
and Gal 2016, 2017). Indeed, the breadth of literature on this
topic across time and fieldsmakes a complete review intractable.
Consequently, we focus on what we view as among the most
important criticisms of NHST for the biomedical and social
sciences.
2.2. Implausible Null Hypothesis
In the biomedical and social sciences, effects are typically small
and vary considerably across people and contexts. In addi-
tion, measurements are often highly variable and only indirectly
related to underlying constructs of interest; thus, even when
sample sizes are large, the possibilities of systematic bias and
variation can result in the equivalent of small or unrepresen-
tative samples. Consequently, estimates from any single study—
the typical fundamental unit of analysis—are themselves gener-
ally noisy.
In addition, the null hypothesis employed in the overwhelm-
ing majority of applications is the sharp point null hypothesis
of zero effect—that is, no difference among two or more treat-
ments or groups—and zero systematic error—which encom-
passes both the adequacy of the statistical model used to com-
pute the p-value (e.g., in terms of functional form and distribu-
tional assumptions) as well as any and all forms of systematic or
nonsampling errorwhich vary by field but includemeasurement
error; problems with reliability and validity; biased samples;
nonrandom treatment assignment; missingness; nonresponse;
failure of double-blinding; noncompliance; and confounding.
The combination of these features of the biomedical and
social sciences and this sharp point null hypothesis of zero effect
and zero systematic error is highly problematic. Specifically,
because effects are generally small and variable, the assumption
of zero effect is false. Further, even were the assumption of zero
effect true for somephenomenon, the effect under consideration
in any study designed to examine this phenomenon would not
be zero because measurements are generally noisy and system-
atically so. Consequently, the sharp point null hypothesis of zero
effect and zero systematic error employed in the overwhelming
majority of applications is implausible (Berkson 1938; Edwards,
Lindman, and Savage 1963; Bakan 1966; Meehl 1990; Tukey
1991; Cohen 1994;Gelman et al. 2014;McShane andBöckenholt
2014; Gelman 2015) and thus uninteresting.
These problems are exacerbated under a lexicographic deci-
sion rule for publication as per the status quo and the Benjamin
et al. (2018) proposal. Specifically, because noisy estimates that
attain statistical significance are upwardly biased in magnitude
(potentially to a large degree) and often of the wrong sign
(Gelman and Carlin 2014), a lexicographic decision rule results
in a tarnished literature. In addition, because many smaller,
less resource-intensive, noisier studies are more likely to yield
(or can be made more likely to yield; Simmons, Nelson, and
Simonsohn 2011) one or more statistically significant results
than fewer larger, more resource-intensive, better studies, a lexi-
cographic decision rule at least indirectly encourages the former
over the latter. These issues are compounded when researchers
engage in multiple comparisons—whether actual or potential
(i.e., the “garden of forking paths”; Gelman and Loken 2014).
In sum, various features of the biomedical and social
sciences—for example, small and variable effects, systematic
error, noisy measurements, a lexicographic decision rule for
publication, and research practices—make NHST and in
particular the sharp point null hypothesis of zero effect and zero
systematic error particularly poorly suited for these domains.
2.3. Categorization of Evidence
NHST is associated with a number of problems related to
the dichotomization of evidence into the different categories
“statistically significant” and “not statistically significant” (or,
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sometimes, trichotomization with “marginally significant” as
an intermediate category) depending upon where the p-value
stands relative to certain conventional thresholds. Indeed,
one well-known criticism of the NHST paradigm is that the
conventional 0.05 threshold—or for thatmatter any other one—
is entirely arbitrary (Fisher 1926; Yule andKendall 1950; Cramer
1955; Cochran 1976; Cowles and Davis 1982).
A related line of criticism suggests that the problem is with
having a threshold in the first place: the dichotomization (or
trichotomization) of evidence into different categories of sta-
tistical significance itself has “no ontological basis” (Rosnow
andRosenthal 1989). Specifically, Rosnow andRosenthal (1989)
note that “from an ontological viewpoint, there is no sharp line
between a ‘significant’ and a ‘nonsignificant’ difference; signifi-
cance in statistics...varies continuously between extremes” and
thus advocate “view[ing] the strength of evidence for or against
the null as a fairly continuous function of the magnitude of p.”
While we agree treating the p-value continuously rather than
in a thresholdedmanner constitutes an improvement, we go fur-
ther and argue that it seldom makes sense to calibrate evidence
as a function of the p-value. We hold this for at least three rea-
sons. First, and in our view themost important, it seldommakes
sense because the p-value is, in the overwhelming majority of
applications, defined relative to the generally implausible and
uninteresting sharp point null hypothesis of zero effect and zero
systematic error. Second, because it is a poormeasure of the evi-
dence for or against a statistical hypothesis (Edwards, Lindman,
and Savage 1963; Berger and Sellke 1987; Cohen 1994; Hubbard
and Lindsay 2008). Third, because it tests the hypothesis that
one ormoremodel parameters equal the tested values—but only
given all other model assumptions. These other assumptions—
in particular, zero systematic error—seldom hold (or are at
least far from given) in the biomedical and social sciences.
Consequently, “a small p-value only signals that there may be a
problemwith at least one assumption,without sayingwhich one.
Asymmetrically, a large p-value only means that this particular
test did not detect a problem—perhaps because there is none, or
because the test is insensitive to the problems, or because biases
and random errors largely canceled each other out” (Greenland
2017). We note similar considerations hold for other purely
statistical measures.
2.4. Erroneous Scientific Reasoning
The NHST paradigm and the p-value thresholds intrinsic to
it are not only problematic in and of themselves but also they
routinely result in erroneous scientific reasoning. For example,
researchers typically take the rejection of the sharp point null
hypothesis of zero effect and zero systematic error as positive
or even definitive evidence in favor of some preferred alterna-
tive hypothesis—a logical fallacy. In addition, they often make
scientific conclusions largely if not entirely based on whether or
not a p-value crosses the 0.05 threshold instead of taking a more
holistic view of the evidence that includes the consideration of
the currently subordinate factors. Further, they often confuse
statistical significance and practical importance (see, e.g., Free-
man 1993). Finally, they often incorrectly believe a result with
a p-value below 0.05 is evidence that a relationship is causal
(Holman et al. 2001).
In addition, because the assignment of evidence to different
categories (e.g., statistically significant and not statistically
significant) is a strong inducement to the conclusion that
the items thusly assigned are categorically different, NHST
encourages researchers to engage in dichotomous thinking,
that is, to interpret evidence dichotomously rather than
continuously. Specifically, researchers interpret evidence that
reaches the conventional threshold for statistical significance as
a demonstration of a difference, and, in contrast, they interpret
evidence that fails to reach this threshold as a demonstration of
no difference.
An example of erroneous reasoning resulting from dichoto-
mous thinking is provided by Gelman and Stern (2006) who
show that applied researchers often fail to appreciate that “the
difference between ‘significant’ and ‘not significant’ is not itself
statistically significant.” Additional examples are provided by
McShane and Gal (2016) who show that researchers across
a wide variety of fields including medicine, epidemiology,
cognitive science, psychology, and economics (i) interpret p-
values dichotomously rather than continuously, focusing solely
on whether or not the p-value is below 0.05 rather than the
magnitude of the p-value; (ii) fixate on p-values even when
they are irrelevant, for example, when asked about descriptive
statistics; and (iii) ignore other evidence, for example, the
magnitude of treatment differences. McShane and Gal (2017)
show that even statisticians are susceptible to these errors.
2.5. Misinterpretation of the p-Value
A final criticism against the NHST paradigm pertains to com-
mon misinterpretations of the p-value. While formally defined
as the probability of observing data as extreme or more extreme
than that actually observed assuming the null hypothesis is true,
the p-value has often been misinterpreted as, inter alia, (i) the
probability that the null hypothesis is true, (ii) one minus the
probability that the alternative hypothesis is true, or (iii) one
minus the probability of replication. For example, Gigerenzer
(2004) reports an example of research conducted on psychology
professors, lecturers, teaching assistants, and students. Subjects
were given the result of a simple t-test of two independentmeans
(t = 2.7, df = 18, p = 0.01) and were asked six true or
false questions based on the result and designed to test common
misinterpretations of the p-value. All six of the statements were
false and, despite the fact that the study materials noted “several
or none of the statements may be correct,” (i) none of the 45
students, (ii) only four of the 39 professors and lectures who did
not teach statistics, and (iii) only six of the 30 professors and
lectures who did teach statistics marked all as false (members of
each group marked an average of 3.5, 4.0, and 4.1 statements,
respectively, as false). For related results, see Oakes (1986);
Cohen (1994); Haller and Krauss (2002); Gigerenzer (2018).
3. Problems Specific to the Benjamin et al. (2018)
Proposal
Beyond concerns about the NHST paradigm upon which the
status quo and the Benjamin et al. (2018) proposal rest, there
are additional problems specific to the latter proposal. First,
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Benjamin et al. (2018) propose the 0.005 threshold because it (i)
“corresponds to Bayes factors between approximately 14 and 26”
in favor of the alternative hypothesis and (ii) “would reduce the
false positive rate to levels we judge to be reasonable.” However,
little to no justification is provided for either of these choices of
levels.
Second, Benjamin et al. (2018) “restrict [their] recommen-
dation to claims of discovery of new effects” which is prob-
lematic for at least two reasons. First, the proposed policy is
rendered entirely impractical because they fail to define what
constitutes a new effect; this is especially so in domains where
research is believed to be incremental and cumulative. Second,
the proposed policy would lead to incoherence when applied to
replication—the very issue their proposal ismeant to address. In
particular, the order inwhich two independent studies of a com-
mon phenomenon are conducted ought to be irrelevant but is
not under the Benjamin et al. (2018) proposal. Specifically, given
one study with p < 0.005 and another with p ∈ (0.005, 0.05),
it would matter crucially which study was conducted first (and
thus was “new”) under the definition of replication employed
in practice (i.e., a subsequent study is considered to successfully
replicate a prior study if either both fail to attain statistical signif-
icance or both attain statistical significance and are directionally
consistent): the second (replication) study would be deemed a
success under the Benjamin et al. (2018) proposal if the first
study was the p < 0.005 study but a failure otherwise.
Third, the fact that uncorrectedmultiple comparisons—both
actual and potential—are the norm in applied research strictly
speaking invalidates all p-values outside those from studies with
preregistered protocols and data analysis procedures. This con-
cern is acknowledged by Benjamin et al. (2018). Nonetheless,
what goes unacknowledged is that even with preregistration, p-
values can be invalidated if the underlyingmodel that generated
the p-value is misspecified in an important manner.
Fourth, the mathematical justification underlying the Ben-
jamin et al. (2018) proposal has come under no small amount
of criticism. Specifically, the uniformly most powerful Bayesian
tests (UMPBTs) that underlie the proposal were introduced and
defended by Johnson (2013b) in parallel with his call in Johnson
(2013a)—and now repeated in Benjamin et al. (2018)—to use
0.005 as the new threshold. We see a number of concerns with
UMPBTs that we discuss in Appendix A. Perhaps most relevant
for the biomedical and social sciences, the UMPBT approach
is deeply entrenched in the century-old Neyman–Pearson for-
malism of binary decisions and 0–1 loss functions which does
not in general map, even in an approximate way, to processes of
scientific learning or costs and benefits. Consequently, the logic
underlying the proposal to move to a lower p-value threshold
avoids firmly confronting the nature of the issue: any such rule
implicitly expresses a particular tradeoff between Type I and
Type II error, but in reality this tradeoff should depend on the
costs, benefits, and probabilities of all outcomes (Gelman and
Robert 2014) which in turn depend on the problem at hand and
which vary tremendously across studies and domains.
More speculatively, we are not convinced the more stringent
0.005 threshold for statistical significance would be helpful. In
the short term, it could reduce the flow of low quality work that
is currently polluting even top journals. In the medium term, it
could motivate researchers to perform higher-quality work that
is more likely to crack the 0.005 barrier. On the other hand, it
could lead to even more overconfidence in results that do get
published as well as a concomitant greater exaggeration of the
effect sizes associated with such results. It could also lead to
the discounting of important findings that happen not to reach
the more stringent threshold. In sum, we have no idea whether
implementation of the proposed 0.005 threshold would improve
or degrade the state of science as we can envision both positive
and negative outcomes resulting from it. Ultimately, while this
question may be interesting if difficult to answer, we view it as
outside our purview because we believe that thresholds whether
based on p-values or other purely statistical measures are a bad
idea.
Perhaps curiously, we do not necessarily expect that Ben-
jamin et al. (2018) would disagree with our criticism that their
proposal is insufficient to overcome current difficulties with
replication (or perhaps even with our own proposal to abandon
statistical significance). After all, they “restrict [their] recom-
mendation to claims of discovery of new effects” and recognize
that “the choice of any particular threshold is arbitrary” and
“should dependon the prior odds that the null hypothesis is true,
the number of hypotheses tested, the study design, the relative
cost of Type I versus Type II errors, and other factors that vary by
research topic.” Indeed, “many of [the authors] agree that there
are better approaches to statistical analyses than null hypothesis
significance testing.”
4. Abandoning Statistical Significance
4.1. Summation and Recommendations
What can be done? Statistics is hard, especially when effects
are small and variable and measurements are noisy. There are
no quick fixes. Proposals such as changing the default p-value
threshold for statistical significance, employing confidence
intervals with a focus on whether or not they contain zero, or
employing Bayes factors along with conventional classifications
for evaluating the strength of evidence suffer from the same
or similar issues as the current use of p-values with the 0.05
threshold. In particular, each implicitly or explicitly catego-
rizes evidence based on thresholds relative to the generally
implausible and uninteresting sharp point null hypothesis of
zero effect and zero systematic error. Further, each is a purely
statistical measure that fails to take a more holistic view of
the evidence that includes the consideration of the currently
subordinate factors, that is, related prior evidence, plausibility
of mechanism, study design and data quality, real world costs
and benefits, novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by
research domain.
In brief, each is a form of statistical alchemy that falsely
promises to transmute randomness into certainty, an “uncer-
tainty laundering” (Gelman 2016) that begins with data and
concludes with dichotomous declarations of truth or falsity—
binary statements about there being “an effect” or “no effect”—
based on some p-value or other statistical threshold being
attained. A critical first step forward is to begin accepting
uncertainty and embracing variation in effects (Carlin 2016;
Gelman 2016) and recognizing that we can learn much (indeed,
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more) about theworld by forsaking the false promise of certainty
offered by such dichotomization.
Toward this end, we offer recommendations for how, in
practice, the p-value be demoted from its threshold screening
role and instead, treated continuously, be considered along with
the currently subordinate factors as just one amongmany pieces
of evidence. First, we recommend authors use the currently
subordinate factors to motivate their data collection, statistical
analysis, interpretation of results, writing, and related matters;
we also recommend they analyze and report all of their data and
relevant results. Second, we recommend editors and reviewers
explicitly evaluate papers with regard to not only purely statisti-
cal measures but also the currently subordinate factors.
As a highly interdisciplinary research team with represen-
tation from statistics, political science, psychology, and con-
sumer behavior, we are acutely aware that the implementation
of our broad recommendations will and ought to vary tremen-
dously across—and even within—domains. Further, we are not
so supercilious to believe that we, by ourselves, are capable of
providing concrete and specific guidance on the application
of these recommendations across all or perhaps even in any
of these domains. Indeed, we do not believe a “template” for
our recommendations is possible or desirable. In fact, such a
template could even be dangerous in that it might result in a
rote and recipe-like application of our recommendations that
would not be entirely dissimilar to, even if perhaps less harmful
than, the current practice of rote and recipe-like application of
NHST. To those who might argue that, without such a template,
our recommendations are unrealistic or unlikely to be adopted
in practice, we reiterate that statistics is hard and a formulaic
approach to statistics is a principal cause of the current replica-
tion crisis. It is for these reasons we advocate this more radical
andmore difficult but alsomore principled andmore permanent
approach. Nonetheless, we below suggest some broad principles
that show how our recommendations might be applied. We also
provide a case study in Appendix B.
4.2. For Authors
We recommend authors use the currently subordinate factors to
motivate their data collection, statistical analysis, interpretation
of results, writing, and relatedmatters; we also recommend they
analyze and report all of their data and relevant results rather
than focusing on single comparisons that attain some p-value
or other statistical threshold.
One specific operationalization of the first part of our recom-
mendation might be to include in their manuscripts a section
that directly addresses how each of the currently subordinate
factors motivated their various decisions regarding data collec-
tion, statistical analysis, interpretation of results, and writing
in the context of the totality of the data and results. Such a
section could, for example, discuss study design in the context
of subject-matter knowledge and expectations of effect sizes as
discussed by Gelman and Carlin (2014). It could also discuss
the plausibility of the mechanism by (i) formalizing the hypoth-
esized mechanism for the effect in question and expounding on
the various components of it, (ii) clarifying which components
were measured and analyzed in the study, and (iii) discussing
aspects of the results that support as well as those that under-
mine the hypothesized mechanism.
Onemight think that the secondpart of our recommendation
—to analyze and report all of the data and relevant results—is
such a fundamental principle of science that it need hardly be
mentioned. However, this is not the case! As discussed above,
the status quo in scientific publication is a lexicographic decision
rule whereby p < 0.05 is virtually always required for a result
to be published and, while there are some exceptions, standard
practice is to focus on such results and to not report all relevant
findings.
Given the current state of practice, authors may not have a
sense for how they might go about this. Rather than attempt to
provide broad guidance, we direct the reader to illustrations in
clinical psychology (Tackett et al. 2014), epidemiology (Gelman
and Auerbach 2016a,b), political science (Trangucci et al. 2018),
program evaluation (Mitchell et al. 2018), and social psychology
and consumer behavior (McShane and Böckenholt 2017) as well
as our case study in Appendix B.
4.3. For Editors and Reviewers
We recommend editors and reviewers explicitly evaluate papers
with regard to not only purely statistical measures but also the
currently subordinate factors; this should be far superior to the
status quo, namely giving consideration—often scant—to the
currently subordinate factors only once some p-value or other
statistical threshold has been reached.
One specific operationalization of this recommendation
might be to incorporate consideration of these factors into
various stages of the review process. For example, editors could
require reviewers to provide quantitative evaluations of each
factor—including domain-specific factors determined by the
editor—as well as an overall quantitative evaluation of the
strength of evidence as a supplement to the current open-ended,
qualitative evaluations. These could then be weighted by the
editors’ publicly disclosed (or even reviewers’ own) importance
rating of each factor. Additionally, editors could discuss and
address the evaluation and importance of each factor in decision
letters, thereby providing a more holistic view of the evidence.
One might object here and call our position naive: do not
editors and reviewers require some bright-line threshold to
decide whether the data supporting a claim is far enough from
pure noise to support publication? Do not statistical thresholds
provide objective standards for what constitutes evidence, and
does this not in turn provide a valuable brake on the subjectivity
and personal biases of editors and reviewers? Against these, we
would argue that even were such a threshold needed, it would
not make sense to set it based on the p-value given that it
seldom makes sense to calibrate evidence as a function of this
statistic and given that the costs and benefits of publishing noisy
results varies by field. Additionally, the p-value is not a purely
objective standard: different model specifications and statistical
tests for the same data and null hypothesis yield different p-
values; to complicate matters further, many subjective decisions
regarding data protocols and analysis procedures such as coding
and exclusion are required in practice and these often strongly
impact the p-value ultimately reported. Finally, we fail to seewhy
such a threshold screening rule is needed: editors and reviewers
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already make publication decisions one at a time based on
qualitative factors, and this could continue to happen if the p-
value were demoted from its threshold screening rule to just one
among many pieces of evidence. Indeed, no single number—
whether it be a p-value, Bayes factor, or some other statistical
or nonstatistical measure—is capable of eliminating subjectivity
and personal biases.
Instead, we believe it is entirely acceptable to publish a paper
featuring a result with, say, a p-value of 0.2 or a 90% confidence
interval that includes zero provided it is relevant to a theoretical
or applied question of interest and the interpretation is suffi-
ciently accurate. It should also be possible to publish a result
with, say, a p-value of 0.001 without this being taken to imply
the truth of some favored alternative hypothesis.
The p-value is relevant to the question of how easily a result
could be explained by a particular null model, but there is no
reason this should be the crucial factor in publication. A result
can be consistentwith a nullmodel but still be relevant to science
or policy debates, and a result can reject a null model without
offering anything of scientific interest or policy relevance.
In sum, editors and reviewers can and should feel free to
accept papers and present readers with the relevant evidence.
We would much rather see a paper that, for example, states that
there is weak evidence for an interesting finding but that existing
data remain consistent with null effects than for the publication
process to screen out such findings or encourage authors to
cheat to obtain statistical significance.
4.4. Abandoning Statistical Significance Outside Scientific
Publishing
While our focus has been on statistical significance thresholds
in scientific publication, similar issues arise in other areas of sta-
tistical decision making, including, for example, neuroimaging
where researchers use voxelwise NHSTs to decide which results
to report or take seriously; medicine where regulatory agencies
such as the Food andDrugAdministration use NHSTs to decide
whether or not to approve newdrugs; policy analysiswhere non-
governmental and other organizations use NHSTs to determine
whether interventions are beneficial or not; and business where
managers use NHSTs to make binary decisions via A/B tests. In
addition, thresholds arise not just around scientific publication
but also within research projects, for example, when researchers
use NHSTs to decide which avenues to pursue further based on
preliminary findings.
While considerations around taking a more holistic view of
the evidence and consequences of decisions are rather different
across each of these settings and different from those in scientific
publication, we nonetheless believe our proposal to demote the
p-value from its threshold screening role and emphasize the
currently subordinate factors applies in these settings. For exam-
ple, in neuroimaging, the voxelwise NHST approach misses the
point in that there are typically no true zeros and changes are
generally happening at all brain locations at all times. Plotting
images of estimates and uncertainties makes sense to us, but we
see no advantage in using a threshold.
For regulatory, policy, and business decisions, cost-benefit
calculations seem clearly superior to acontextual statistical
thresholds. Specifically, and as noted, such thresholds implicitly
express a particular tradeoff between Type I and Type II error,
but in reality this tradeoff should depend on the costs, benefits,
and probabilities of all outcomes.
That said, we acknowledge that thresholds—of a nonstatis-
tical variety—may sometimes be useful in these settings. For
example, consider a firm contemplating sending a costly offer
to customers. Suppose the firm has a customer-level model of
the revenue expected in response to the offer. In this setting,
it could make sense for the firm to send the offer only to cus-
tomers that yield an expected profit greater than some threshold,
say, zero.
Even in pure research scenarios where there is no obvi-
ous cost-benefit calculation—for example, a comparison of the
underlyingmechanisms, as opposed to the efficacy, of two drugs
used to treat some disease—we see no value in p-value or other
statistical thresholds. Instead, we would like to see researchers
simply report results: estimates, standard errors, confidence
intervals, etc., with statistically inconclusive results being rele-
vant for motivating future research.
While we see the intuitive appeal of using p-value or
other statistical thresholds as a screening device to decide
what avenues (e.g., ideas, drugs, or genes) to pursue further,
this approach fundamentally does not make efficient use of
data: there is in general no connection between a p-value—a
probability based on a particular null model—and either the
potential gains from pursuing a potential research lead or the
predictive probability that the lead in question will ultimately
be successful. Instead, to the extent that decisions do need
to be made about which lines of research to pursue further,
we recommend making such decisions using a model of the
distribution of effect sizes and variation, thus working directly
with hypotheses of interest rather than reasoning indirectly
from a null model.
We would also like to see—when possible in these and other
settings—more precise individual-levelmeasurements, a greater
use of within-person or longitudinal designs, and increased
consideration of models that use informative priors, that fea-
ture varying treatment effects, and that are multilevel or meta-
analytic in nature (Gelman 2015, 2017; McShane and Böcken-
holt 2017, 2018).
4.5. Getting FromHere to There
How do we get from here—NHST, deterministic summaries,
overconfidence in results, and statistical analysis focused on
reporting just some of the data—to there—statistical analy-
sis and interpretation of results that accepts uncertainty and
embraces variation and that features full reporting of results
rather than focusing on whatever happens to exceed some sta-
tistical threshold?
We have offered the recommendations that we believe will
serve researchers best. However, we recognize that research
takes place within an institutional structure that often encour-
ages behavior that is counter to these recommendations.
Researchers respond to the expectations of funding agencies in
study design and editors and reviewers in writing. Conversely,
funding agencies must choose among the submissions they
receive and editors can only publish papers that are submitted
to them. A careful research proposal that openly grapples
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with uncertainty may unfortunately lose out in the funding
competition to a more traditional proposal that blithely
promises 80% power based on selected and overestimated effect
sizes. Similarly, a paper that presents all the data withoutmaking
inappropriate claims of certainty may not get published in a
journal that also receives submissions in which statistically
significant results are presented at face value.
These institutional problems are difficult and we do not pro-
pose solutions to them. We imagine improvement will come in
fits and starts, in several parallel tracks, all of which we and oth-
ers have tried to contribute to in our applied and methodolog-
ical research: improved statistical methods that move beyond
NHST and include multilevel modeling, machine learning, sta-
tistical graphics, and other tools for analyzing and visualizing
large amounts of data; applied examples using these improved
methods, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to perform
successful statistical analyses without aiming for deterministic
results; theoretical work on the statistical effects of selection
based on statistical significance and other decision criteria; and
criticism of published work with gross overestimates of effect
sizes or inappropriate claims of certainty. While we recognize
change will likely require institutional reform including major
modifications of current practices of funding agencies and edi-
tors and reviewers, we are also optimistic that some combination
of recognition of error and awareness of alternatives can also
motivate change.
5. Discussion
In this article, we have proposed to abandon statistical sig-
nificance and offered recommendations for how this can be
implemented in the scientific publication process as well as
in statistical decision making more broadly. We reiterate that
we have no desire to “ban” p-values or other purely statistical
measures. Rather, we believe that such measures should not be
thresholded and that, thresholded or not, they should not take
priority over the currently subordinate factors.
While our proposal to abandon statistical significance may
seem on the surface quite radical, at least one aspect of it—
to treat p-values or other purely statistical measures contin-
uously rather than in a thresholded manner—most certainly
is not. Indeed, this was advocated by Fisher himself (Fisher
1956; Greenland and Poole 2013) as well as by other early and
eminent statisticians includingPearson (Hurlbert andLombardi
2009), Cox (Cox 1977, 1982), and Lehmann (Lehmann 1993;
Senn 2001). It has also been advocated outside of statistics
over the decades (see, e.g., Boring 1919; Eysenck 1960; Skipper,
Guenther, and Nass 1967) and recently (see, e.g., Drummond
2015; Lemoine et al. 2016; Amrhein, Korner-Nievergelt, and
Roth 2017; Greenland 2017; Amrhein and Greenland 2018).
Finally, it is fully consistent with the recent American Statistical
Association (ASA) Statement on Statistical Significance and
p-values (“Principle 3: Scientific conclusions and business or
policy decisions should not be based only on whether a p-value
passes a specific threshold;” Wasserstein and Lazar 2016). In
sum, this aspect of our proposal is part of a long literature
both inside and outside of statistics over the decades that stands
in direct opposition to the threshold-based status quo and the
Benjamin et al. (2018) proposal.
Where our proposal might move beyond this literature is
in three ways. First, we suggest that p-values or other purely
statistical measures, thresholded or not, should not take priority
over the currently subordinate factors (that said, others too
have emphasized this including the recentASA Statementwhich
advises that “researchers should bring many contextual factors
into play to derive scientific inferences, including the design of a
study, the quality of themeasurements, the external evidence for
the phenomenon under study, and the validity of assumptions
that underlie the data analysis” and cautions that “no single
index should substitute for scientific reasoning;” Wasserstein
and Lazar 2016). Second, as discussed above, while we believe
treating the p-value continuously rather than in a thresholded
manner constitutes an improvement, we go further and argue
that it seldommakes sense to calibrate evidence as a function of
the p-value or other purely statistical measures. Third, we offer
recommendations for authors as well as editors and reviewers
for how our proposal to abandon statistical significance can be
implemented in the scientific publication process as well as in
statistical decision making more broadly.
Our recommendations will not themselves resolve the repli-
cation crisis, but we believe they will have the salutary effect of
pushing researchers away from the pursuit of irrelevant statis-
tical targets and toward understanding of theory, mechanism,
and measurement. We also hope they will push them to move
beyond the paradigm of routine “discovery,” and binary state-
ments about there being “an effect” or “no effect,” to one of
continuous and inevitably flawed learning that is accepting of
uncertainty and variation.
Appendix A. ProblemsWith Uniformly Most Powerful
Bayesian Tests
The mathematical justification underlying the Benjamin et al. (2018)
proposal has come under no small amount of criticism. Specifically, the
UMPBTs that underlie the proposal were introduced and defended by
Johnson (2013b) in parallel with his call in Johnson (2013a)—and now
repeated in Benjamin et al. (2018)—to use 0.005 as the new threshold.
We see a number of concerns with UMPBTs.
First, and perhaps most relevant for the biomedical and social
sciences, the UMPBT approach is deeply entrenched in the century-
old Neyman–Pearson formalism of binary decisions and 0–1 loss func-
tions. As Pericchi, Pereira, and Pérez (2014) note, “the essence of the
problem of classical testing of significance lies in its goal of minimizing
Type II error (false negative) for a fixed Type I error (false positive).”
While this formalism allows for mathematical optimization under
some restricted collection of distributions and testing problems, it is
quite rudimentary from a decision theoretical point of view, even to
the extent of failing most purposes of conducting a sharp point null
hypothesis test.
More specifically, the 0–1 loss function implicit in the NHST
paradigm does not in general map, even in an approximate way, to
processes of scientific learning or costs and benefits. Consequently, the
logic underlying the proposal to move to a lower p-value threshold
avoids firmly confronting the nature of the issue: any such rule
implicitly expresses a particular tradeoff between Type I and Type
II error, but in reality this tradeoff should depend on the costs, benefits,
and probabilities of all outcomes (Gelman and Robert 2014) which
in turn depend on the problem at hand and which vary tremendously
across studies and domains. Instead, theUMPBT is based on aminimax
prior that does not correspond to any distribution of effect sizes but
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rather represents a worst case scenario under a set of mathematical
assumptions.
Second, there is no reason for non-Bayesians’ to adopt UMPBTs
when they can instead rely on the standard Neyman–Pearson approach
to uniformly most powerful (non-Bayesian) tests.
Third, defining the dependence of the procedure over a threshold
(γ in the notation of Johnson (2013b)) replicates the fundamental
difficulty with the century-old Fisherian answer to hypothesis testing.
To further seek a full agreement with the classical rejection region as
advocated by Johnson (2013b) is to simply negate the appeal of a truly
Bayesian approach to this issue; moreover, this agreement is impossible
to achieve for realistic statistical models.
Fourth, the construction of a UMPBT relies on the assumption of
a “true” prior, which can be criticized in a vast majority of cases and
which in any case moves one away from the Bayesian paradigm: with
a single and “true” prior, the Bayesian model becomes an errors-in-
variables model.
Fifth, the argument to maximize a probability for the Bayes factor
to exceed a certain threshold also moves one away from the Bayesian
paradigm because: (i) it ignores the motives for running the NHST
and the subsequent steps taken in decision making or inference; (ii)
it further negates any prior modeling of the alternative hypothesis
aimed at separating the parameter space into regions of different (prior)
likelihood; (iii) it does not condition upon the actual observations but
instead integrates over the observation space and hence may fall afoul
of the likelihood principle; (iv) it posits a single and fixed threshold
γ for rejecting the null when there is no reason for γ not to depend
on the observed data, as also argued above; (v) the maximization step
eliminates the role of the prior distribution, as also argued above; (vi)
in the rare one-dimensional settings where the maximization step can
be conducted in closed form, the solution is a distribution with finite
support; (vii) in the event the null hypothesis is rejected, the uniformly
most powerful prior (or alt-prior) corresponding to the alternative
cannot be used as such in subsequent inference but must instead be
replaced with a regular prior over the whole parameter space—a strong
violation of Bayesian coherence.
Sixth, speakingmore generally, the concept of uniformlymost pow-
erful priors (and tests) does not easily extend to multivariate settings
and even less to realistic cases that involve complex null hypotheses that
contain nuisance parameters. The first solution proposed in Johnson
(2013b), to integrate out the nuisance parameters in the null hypothesis
using a specific prior distribution, falls short of solving the issue of
“objective Bayesian tests.” The second solution, namely to replace the
unknown nuisance parameters with standard estimates, stands even
farther from a Bayesian perspective.
Indeed, the Bayes factor itself is a consequence of the rudimentary
Neyman–Pearson formalism, which as such caters to the issue of sta-
tistical significance. A discussion of the difficulties with this from a
Bayesian perspective is provided in Kamary et al. (2014), with a pro-
posal of setting the hypothesis problem as one of mixture estimation.
Seventh, Johnson (2013b) contains very little support for the asymp-
totic relevance of the approach, beyond the limiting normal distribu-
tion of the uniformly most powerful log Bayes factor and the conver-
gence of the support to the “true” value of the parameter.
In closing, we note that many of our criticisms of the Johnson
(2013b) approach relate to the fact that it falls short of being truly
Bayesian. However, we do not mean to say that hypothesis testing
must be done in a Bayesian manner. Rather, we emphasize this
because, to the extent that the Johnson (2013b) approach loses
its Bayesian connection, it also loses a Bayesian justification for
the 0.005 rule. Consequently, 0.005 becomes just another arbitrary
threshold, justified by some implicit tradeoff between false positives
and negatives which we think does not make sense in any absolute and
acontextual way.
Appendix B. Case Study
In the context of a hypothetical case study on the effects of sodium on
blood pressure, we discuss how authors as well as editors and reviewers
might follow our recommendation to demote the p-value from its
threshold screening role and instead treat it continuously alongwith the
currently subordinate factors—related prior evidence, plausibility of
mechanism, study design and data quality, real world costs and benefits,
novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by research domain—as
just one among many pieces of evidence.
We recommend authors use the currently subordinate factors to
motivate their data collection, statistical analysis, interpretation of
results, writing, and related matters. In this example, the authors might
consider related prior evidence that indicates the importance of blood
pressure as a marker for healthy arteries, suggests the role of sodium
in hemodynamics, and so forth. This evidence might also reveal a
plausible mechanism, namely to excrete excess sodium the body must
increase blood pressure.
In terms of study design and data quality, the authors might con-
sider various possibilities for data collection. How should they recruit
subjects? Should they randomize them to a low-sodium versus high-
sodium diet? Or should they track them longitudinally, say via routine
annual checkups over the course of years? Or is such data already
available from some prior study? When and how often should sodium
and blood pressure be measured? And how? The authors might mea-
sure sodium through a dietary recall questionnaire (noisy), through
asking participants to maintain a food diary (somewhat less noisy),
or through collection of urine to measure urinary sodium excretion
(precise but restricted to a limited time point). Likewise, for blood
pressure, they might rely on measurements conducted by someone
convenient like friends or family members of the subjects who likely
do not possess formal clinical training (noisy) or by paid clinicians
instructed on the proper protocol for blood pressure measurement
(precise but expensive).
Suppose the authors hypothesize a positive association between
sodium consumption and high blood pressure. For the moment, let
us assume that—while eschewing the NHST paradigm and the p-value
thresholds intrinsic to it—the authors nonetheless perform a statistical
analysis that results in a p-value. Further, let us assume they obtain a p-
value of 0.001. How should this impact their interpretation of results,
writing, and statistical decision making more broadly? Certainly, they
have gained support for their hypothesis. However, can they conclude
sodium is associated with—or even causes—high blood pressure as
they would under the NHST paradigm?
Well, it would depend on the context and limitations of the study
design and data quality. For example, supposing the study took place in
Japan, perhaps the association exists in the Japanese subject population
studied but does not in European populations whether because of some
genetic differences between the two populations or because of some
dietary differences (e.g., dietary sodium levels are much higher among
Japanese so the association might not hold in levels typical among
Europeans).
In terms of a causal interpretation, this would depend on related
prior evidence, plausibility of mechanism, and study design and data
quality. If prior studies show consistent and strong associations
between sodium consumption and blood pressure, if evidence from
physiological studies and animal models are consistent with an effect
of sodium consumption on blood pressure, or if sodium levels were
randomized, this increases the support for a causal role of sodium in
increasing blood pressure.
Given, say, that the causal interpretation holds and holds broadly,
the authors could then consider clinical significance, that is, real world
costs and benefits. This depends not at all on a p-value but on the
estimates of the magnitude of the effect—not only on blood pressure
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but also on downstream outcomes such as cardiovascular disease—as
well as the uncertainty in them. It also depends on the costs of potential
interventions such as lower sodium diets and drugs. They could also
discuss novelty of finding in light of all of the above.
Now, let us assume they had instead obtained a p-value of 0.2. Can
they conclude sodium is not associatedwith high blood pressure as they
would under the NHST paradigm? Again, this would depend on all the
factors discussed above. For example, perhaps the association does not
exist in the Japanese population but does in European ones and so on.
There are two key points in this. First, results need not first have
a p-value or some other purely statistical measure that attains some
threshold before consideration is given to the currently subordinate
factors. Instead, and as illustrated above, statistical measures should
be considered along with the currently subordinate factors as just
one among many pieces of evidence and should not take priority
thereby yielding amore holistic view of the evidence. Second, statistical
measures should be treated continuously in this more holistic view
of the evidence. Specifically, a lower p-value constitutes continuously
stronger evidence—and this holds regardless of the level of the p-value.
Further, this continuously stronger evidence can be balanced along
with the strengths and weaknesses of the currently subordinate factors
in assessing the level of support for a hypothesis.
Of course, we believe not only that the authors’ statistical analysis
should not be restricted to the NHST paradigm and the p-value thresh-
olds intrinsic to it but also that it need not—and often should not—
even result in a p-value (i.e., because it seldommakes sense to calibrate
evidence as a function of the p-value). As noted, we recommend
authors report all of their data and relevant results rather than focusing
on single comparisons that attain some p-value or other statistical
threshold. In this context, this might involve modeling the association
between sodium and blood pressure as a function of additional health
and dietary variables, demographic variables, and geography using a
multilevel model. Such a model would not yield one single p-value
thereby encouraging dichotomous declarations of truth or falsity—
binary statements about there being “an effect” or “no effect.” Instead, it
would yieldmany estimates that vary based on, for example, health and
dietary variables, demographic variables, and geography, as well as the
uncertainty in these estimates. Indeed, by accepting uncertainty and
embracing variation in effects, the authors would uncover and present
a much richer and more nuanced story about the association between
sodium and blood pressure.
Turning to editors and reviewers, we recommend they explicitly
evaluate papers with regard to not only purely statistical measures but
also the currently subordinate factors. How might this work? We envi-
sion it would be rather similar to the above but in reverse. Specifically,
editors and reviewers evaluating the authors’ paper on sodium and
blood pressure would systemically assess, and possibly even indicate
the weight they assign to, each of the following: How does the paper
fit in with and build upon related prior evidence? Is the mechanism
plausible? Are the study design and data quality sufficient to justify the
conclusions? What are the implications in terms of real world costs and
benefits? How novel are the findings? And, of course, how appropriate
are the statistical analyses employed and how strong is the statistical
support, whether in the form of a p-value or some other measure,
resulting from these analyses?
In this more holistic view of the evidence, statistical measures are
just one among many pieces of evidence considered by editors and
reviewers and do not take priority. Of course, this does not mean
that they cannot or will not strongly impact or alter their evaluation
decisions. For example, in the context of the authors’ paper on sodium
and blood pressure, strong statistical support, whether in the form of
a low p-value or otherwise, for a finding that sodium consumption
is associated with low blood pressure—the direction opposite of that
indicated by prior evidence—in the context of a high quality study
design featuring large samples and precise measurements might be
deemed more novel and worthy of publication than if the statistical
support had been weaker or if the finding was in the same direction
as that indicated by prior evidence.
In sum, authors as well as reviewers and editors need not use
statistical significance as a lexicographic decision rule. Results need
not first have a p-value or some other purely statistical measure that
attains some threshold before consideration is given to the currently
subordinate factors. Instead, treated continuously, statistical measures
should be considered along with the currently subordinate factors as
just one among many pieces of evidence and should not take priority
thereby yielding a more holistic view of the evidence.
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